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4Introduction
The Barotse floodplain is an ecosystem characterized by a 
paradox of widespread poverty amidst high ecological and 
agricultural potential. The CGIAR Research Program on Aquatic 
Agricultural Systems (AAS) seeks to address this paradox on the 
assumption that the rural poor have the potential to transform 
their lives using the aquatic resources in their environment. 
Understanding the conditions for natural resources use and 
management is critical for a program that seeks to transform the 
livelihoods of households dependent on natural resources. The 
purpose of this report is to identify and analyze key governance 
variables influencing the livelihood outcomes of AAS program 
interventions in the Barotse floodplain system.
Simply put, governance concerns the exercise of authority on 
matters of public importance. In the case of the AAS program, this 
exercise of authority comprises decisions, regulations, and the 
enforcement process, all of which influence how rural communities 
access and use natural resources, and how the benefits and costs 
of these uses are distributed. Governance is also an emergent 
property of the interaction of local and external processes. The 
way in which governance manifests itself in form and function 
will depend on the contexts in which actors are operating. In 
this analysis, the major pillars of governance are the interplay 
of stakeholder representation in authority systems at multiple 
levels, distribution of authority, and mechanisms of accountability 
(Ratner et al., 2012).
Governance is comprised, first, of formal rules and rights 
systems—the policy and institutional frameworks mentioned 
earlier. States usually enforce these institutions through law. 
Second, governance includes informal rules and rights systems, 
upheld by tradition, mutual agreement, or relations of power and 
authority (Cousins, 1997). For instance, a prohibition against the 
use of mosquito nets as fishing gear in rivers or lakes is a formal 
rule, while kuomboka, local rules governing the seasonal 
migration of communities between the Barotse floodplain and 
uplands, are informal.1 Governance also includes processes and 
behaviors that influence how actors affect and are affected by the 
rule systems; for instance, how powerful actors can manipulate 
the decision-making system for personal advantage.
Governance outcomes also depend, therefore, on how representative 
the decision-making process is. Variations in governance depend 
on, for example, the extent of male, elite, or external player 
dominance. When economically and politically marginalized 
groups are poorly represented in policy-making processes, the 
resulting rules and institutions can bias natural resource 
governance outcomes against them. How power and authority 
are distributed and the extent to which those in authority are 
accountable to different constituencies define the character of a 
governance system (Jentoft, 2007).
This preliminary governance analysis responds to one basic 
question: How is the governance context at various levels likely 
to influence success or failure in achieving AAS program goals? 
The report focuses on creating an appreciation of the governance 
context in the Barotse floodplain to allow analysis of spaces and 
actors to consider for further action.
Analytical approach
The AAS program seeks to harness the ecological, agricultural, and 
human capital potential in the Barotse floodplain system. Theme 
5 of the AAS program proposal cautions, however, that “the wider 
policy environment has a powerful influence on people’s lives and 
that in the absence of favorable policies and supporting institutions, 
improved technologies are of little long-term benefit” (AAS, 2012a:42). 
This report analyzes the wider governance context that is likely to 
influence the outcomes of the AAS program initiatives by examining 
outputs from the community engagement exercises against the 
background of the governance context at the local, sub-national, 
national, and regional levels. It considers the following questions: 
•	 How does the governance context affect local livelihood  
options now? 
•	 What are the relevant institutions and relationships,  
including those we may not have considered before? 
•	 What factors are unlikely to change, to which we will need to 
adapt? 
•	 Where are the opportunities for improvement? 
•	 What groups might have influence in pursuing such progress?
Data for this analysis is based on participatory action research and 
planning activities in the hub. These activities included community 
visioning and action planning. The communities went through 
a Community Life Competency Process (CLCP) program, which 
is intended to equip communities to work together towards a 
shared vision of improvement. Hub scoping also included a series 
of multi-stakeholder consultations with government and NGO  
actors at different levels. Building on these exercises, we have  
undertaken additional interviews and focus group discussions 
with community representatives, farmers’ associations, government 
workers, and civil society groups to probe particular issues for the 
purpose of this analysis.
We employ an analytical framework detailed in Strengthening  
Governance Across Scales in Aquatic Agricultural Systems (Ratner 
et al., 2012), focused on three dimensions of governance (see 
Table 1). The Collaborative Governance Assessment Guidance Note 
(Ratner, 2012) outlines how this framework can be embedded in 
participatory analysis and action planning. Operationally, the role 
of the governance analysis is outlined in the AAS Rollout  
Handbook (AAS, 2012b) and addresses theme 5 on institutions 
and policy in the AAS Program Proposal (AAS, 2012a).
A premise in this approach is that power and authority are 
dynamic variables. Institutional arrangements therefore do not 
always lead to predictable outcomes. For instance, in Sub-Saharan 
African local government systems in general, the legislature is  
de jure more powerful than the executive; however, we expect this 
relationship to be reversed in some cases. This reversal of roles is 
due, among other things, to the executive’s superior educational 
qualifications and control over resource allocation. In some cases, 
though, the legislature can mobilize its ranks and censure the 
executive (Falk Moore, 1978). What this illustration shows is that 
power and authority in rural settings are moving targets, and that 
analysis of power dynamics must go beyond written policy or law. 
1 Our use of “informal” does not imply a hierarchy where informal authority is regarded as inferior, but points to its origins in locally specific norms, values, 
and institutions.
Table 1. Dimensions of governance
Dimension of 
Governance
Key Question
Stakeholder 
Representation
Which actors are represented in  
decision-making and how?
Distribution of 
Authority
How is formal and informal authority  
distributed in decisions over resources?
Mechanisms of 
Accountability
How are power holders held accountable for 
their decisions and to whom?
5An important implication is that these power dynamics are open 
to influence, which can affect the extent to which the governance 
system recognizes, values, and supports the priorities of rural 
communities.
Arrangements of representation, power, and accountability are 
a product of history; for instance, Zambia’s colonial experience. 
They are also influenced by more recent developments, such as 
the designation and status of the Barotse floodplain as a Ramsar 
Site. Analysis must therefore assess actor responses against these 
historic and more recent realities, and consider multiple levels, 
from local to national and regional.
Natural resource governance context
The Barotse floodplain is located within a broader geographical 
and political system. It is part of the Zambezi River Basin, which 
covers eight countries (see Table 2). Upstream and downstream 
governance contexts have a bearing on what land use options 
are available in the floodplain.
Table 2. The Zambezi Basin countries
Area of the country 
within the basin (km2)
As % of total area of 
the basin (%)
Zambia 574875 42.5
Angola 235423 17.4
Zimbabwe 213036 15.8
Mozambique 162004 12.0
Malawi 108360 8.0
Tanzania 27840 2.1
Namibia 17426 1.3
Botswana 12401 0.9
Source: FAO (1997)
Wetland and water governance arrangements in these Zambezi 
Basin countries are important variables that affect initiatives 
proposed in the Barotse floodplain. Zambia has a national water 
policy that rationalizes water use in the country in line with the 
country’s development plans. National wetland management 
policies, such as the 2011 Zambia Environmental Management 
Act, define what is possible, legitimate, and ethical. Water 
management in the floodplain also needs to be coordinated 
with other sectors, such as health, energy, agriculture, tourism, 
and environment, at a national level. In addition to the individual 
national arrangements vis-à-vis the Zambezi Basin, there are 
regional water-related agreements; for example, the Regional 
Water Policy for the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). This policy includes the Regional Water Resources 
Institutional Framework, which includes policy provisions 
covering institutional arrangements at regional and national 
levels as well as Shared Water Courses Institutions (SWCIs). In line 
with the SADC protocol on shared water courses, the Zambezi 
River is managed under the Zambezi Watercourse Commission 
(ZAMCOM),  which is specifically responsible for the management 
of the Zambezi River Basin (Tumbare, 2008; ZAMCOM, n.d.). The 
floodplain is also protected under the Ramsar Convention, which 
brings another layer of global-level commitments and norms.  
Although we do not expand on global dimensions at length in 
this analysis, suffice it to state that the floodplain is an international 
as well as a national and local resource, and all initiatives need to 
consider this reality.
Planning implications arising from the shared watercourse 
status of the Zambezi include the need to link with the ministries 
responsible for agriculture and water both nationally and 
regionally (Chiuta, 2008). Regional bodies like SADC are critical 
as platforms for lobbying regional stakeholders. The SADC 
Regional Water Policy provides an opportunity for such 
stakeholder coordination consistent with the aims of the AAS 
program (see sidebar).
“In the interests of stakeholder involvement (to support 
participatory management), Shared Water Courses Institutions 
(SWCIs) should develop strong relationships with relevant  
non-government, civil society and local government bodies 
within the shared watercourse. This may be through the  
provision of support to existing bodies and/or forums or 
through the creation of new stakeholder forums at a national, 
basin and/or local level.”
Source: Southern African Development Community Regional 
Water Policy 2005 (Article 9)
From a national perspective, Western Province is ecologically 
marginal and thus the least suitable region in Zambia for the 
production of most crops. Within the province, however, the  
Barotse floodplain presents a niche area of high agricultural 
and ecosystem service potential. Despite this potential, the 
floodplain is increasingly becoming a liability, mainly due to 
the unpredictability of the flooding that damages crops and 
irrigation canals, according to former Provincial Minister John 
Kufuna (personal communication).
In the Barotse floodplain, land belongs to the Litunga (traditional 
leader of the Barotse Royal Establishment), and the headmen and 
women or indunas allocate the land to households on behalf of the 
Litunga. Although the land typically belongs to the men, women 
do the bulk of the farm work, as in most societies with deep-seated 
patriarchal norms. Men mainly do the clearing and plowing. In  
others cases, women do most of the farm work to free men for  
fishing. Agricultural production alone is typically inadequate to  
sustain families for a year (Kent and McCrae, 2012). Off-farm income 
is particularly important to meet household food requirements in 
the hunger season. Therefore, most of the population in the Barotse 
floodplain depends on a mixed-livelihood strategy, combining crop 
farming, livestock keeping, fishing, and harvesting aquatic and  
forestry products. Households supplement their harvests with 
income from selling fish and aquatic plants and working for others.
Because families rely on such a variety of forms of natural 
resource access, resource governance arrangements strongly 
influence household livelihood resilience. In the Barotse 
floodplain, household resilience depends on access to:
a) human capital available for regular and opportunistic  
division of labor; 
b) natural resources: woodlands, grasslands, and fishing sites; 
c) lands of different elevations that are affected differently by 
flooding;
d) alternative sources of income, including markets for fish, 
rice, and aquatic plant products and part-time work; and
e) livestock, especially draft power, for manure and for sale to 
meet household needs.
6In this section, we have shown that international, regional, and 
national institutions are relevant in defining the boundaries of 
what is possible in the Barotse floodplain. At the same time, many 
national and in some cases regional policies may be in place 
but with weak implementation. The planning implication is that 
such an institutional context increases the transactional costs for 
introducing interventions, because there is no guarantee that the 
policy environment on paper reflects what is on the ground.
Local governance arrangements strongly influence household 
food security. Indeed, the generally weak implementation of 
national policy only increases the importance of local institutions 
in directly influencing local livelihood options, as well as mediating
rules and directives from “above.” Below we examine the local 
institutional context in the Barotse floodplain and its implications 
for AAS initiatives.
Local institutional context
In Western Province, two parallel institutions influence  
communities’ access to natural resources (see Figure 1). The Barotse 
Royal Establishment (BRE) represents the traditional system of 
governance. The BRE is an informal system of governance based on 
the norms and values of the Lozi people. In the formal government 
system, on the other hand, the Provincial Minister and the Permanent 
Secretary (PS) head the provincial administration. Below the PS are 
departmental heads in sectors like agriculture, health, and education.
The BRE is the traditional government of the Lozi people. The 
head of the BRE is the Litunga2 (King), who carries the title of His 
Royal Highness. Other ethnic groups found in Western Province, 
including the Illa, Luvale, Mbunda, Nkoya, and Tonga, recognize 
the Litunga’s authority. The traditional government operates 
through chiefs or who comprise a parliament or Kuta, presided 
over by the Prime Minister or Ngambela, who is the 
chief administrator of the BRE. The Litunga appoints and can 
dismiss the Ngambela.
The BRE is a symbol of community interests in the Barotse 
floodplain. Indeed, the support, and sometimes the mere 
presence, of the BRE will guarantee community cooperation. 
For instance, the community visioning and action planning 
report attributes the success of its activities in the community 
to the presence of the BRE: “BRE representatives on the Diagnosis 
and Design Team (DDT) played a very critical role engaging the 
communities and emphasizing the importance of local-based 
facilitation teams.”
However, challenges remain. The community visioning and action 
planning report notes: “Governance issues are critical in the 
communities; this has resulted in low coordination and adherence 
to conservation policies and bylaws. Enforcement of these bylaws is 
a challenge.” Two main tensions account for this challenge. First 
is the tension between government functionaries and traditional 
leaders over leadership roles. Second, while BRE indunas are 
supposed to be custodians of law and order, in some cases they 
are unable to stop certain infringements; for example, disregard 
for the closed fishing season by their food-insecure households. 
Indunas, like other members of the community, are affected by 
the challenges of poverty, unemployment, etc., and have few 
means of survival apart from fishing. Indeed, traditional leaders 
at the village level are sometimes worse off than their subjects. 
In this condition of poverty, the indunas often lack either 
the incentives or the capacity to be effective stewards of the 
environment.
If judged on the basis of press statements, it may appear that 
the BRE and the government are chronically working at cross 
purposes. However, in practice the relationship between the two 
institutions is not fixed, but dynamic. In some instances, there 
is tension between the two, but in other cases they cooperate; 
for instance, the government is always involved in the annual 
kuomboka ceremony organized by the BRE. This institutional 
background has some bearing for planning in the AAS program. 
Both government and traditional leaders have to be involved in the 
planning process, and this engagement allows both groups to agree 
on areas of leadership and recognize each other’s responsibility.
Areas of agreement present particularly promising “entry points” for 
early action that has a good chance of success. In the longer term, 
the relationship between these parallel authority systems is an  
opportunity for institutional innovation in conflict management.
The Litunga 
(Royal Family)
Ngambela 
(Appointed by 
the Litunga)
BRE Kuta
Induna Kuta
Silalo Induna
Provincial Minister 
(Political Appointee)
Permanent Secretary 
(Civil Servant)
Provincial 
Development 
Committee
District 
Development 
Committee
Area Development 
Committee Camp 
Extension Workers
Village/Headman
Figure 1. Parallel leadership in the Barotse floodplain, Western Province 
 Source: Discussions with various stakeholders in Mongu
Community livelihood options and 
governance implications
Up to this point, we have focused on introducing the governance 
context in the Barotse floodplain. In this section, we want to relate 
the livelihood aspirations of the communities in the floodplain 
to the prevailing governance context in order to help identify 
pathways to change that take into account the institutional 
dynamics and power relationships at local and sub-national 
levels. Building on the community visioning exercises, we have 
identified three main topics across the hub. These are: 
1. improved farming practices and crop diversification; 
2. livestock management and diversification; and 
3. sustainable management of fisheries.
2 Litunga is a Luyana word, which literally translates to “land” or “nation” (http://www.barotseland.info/Litunga.htm).
7Table 3. Summary of governance issues identified
Stakeholder Distribution of Authority Mechanisms of Accountability
Improved farming practices and 
crop diversification
•	 Elites have better access 
to the plains
•	 Land allocation is male 
dominated
•	 BRE judgment mediated 
by status of respondent
•	 Contest for authority 
between the government 
and the BRE
•	 Programs designed for 
the poor hijacked by the 
elites
•	 Incentives emphasize 
upward accountability in 
the extension systems
Livestock management and 
diversification (includes small 
livestock)
•	 Farmers’ associations 
have little voice
•	 Policy bias towards cattle 
owners
•	 Weak enforcement of 
rangeland management 
rules
•	 Crop and cattle contests 
over land use; weak  
arbitration from leaders
•	  Few services addressing 
poorer livestock  
holders (e.g., women  
raising chickens)
•	 Elites finance their own 
extension services,  
reducing pressure for  
accountability
Sustainable management of 
fisheries
•	 The traditional leaders 
are not always involving 
subjects
•	 Women and men have 
distinct and sometimes 
competing interests
•	 Communities take 
advantage of contest 
between BRE and  
Department of Fisheries 
(DOF)
•	 DOF enforcement  
ineffective without  
BRE consent
•	 Illegal fishing widespread, 
indicating disregard for 
conservation incentives
•	 Self-interest makes  
leaders allow illegal  
fishing
•	 Leaders not always  
accountable in  
community-based  
programs
•	 Some communities  
benefit from poor  
coordination among 
NGOs
The key governance issues for each topic are summarized in Table 3 and detailed in the sections that follow.
Issue 1. Improved farming practices and crop 
diversification
The communities identified improved farming practices and crop 
diversification as a key result area to address food and nutrition 
security in the hub. In this section, we present the context in 
which crop production is embedded. The government of Zambia 
has decentralized some of its roles, including the agricultural  
Provincial
Agricultural
Coordination
Office
District Agricultural
Coordination
Office in charge of
blocks
District Agricultural
Coordination
Office in charge of
blocks
Camp comprising
villages under
extension officer
Camp comprising
villages under
extension officer
Camp comprising
villages under
extension officer
Figure 2. Agricultural extension system in Western Province
ministry. A Provincial Agricultural Coordination Office (PACO) for
Western Province is located in the administrative capital of 
Mongu. Figure 2 depicts the governance structure of the  
government extension system.
8The PACO has a network of decentralized District Agricultural 
Coordination Offices (DACO) in the seven districts of the province. 
The camp is the lowest planning unit in the Agriculture Ministry. 
Each camp, comprising about 100 households, is under an  
agricultural extension officer. The government-supported Farm 
Input Support Program (FISP) envisions an extension system  
decentralized to the lowest levels. As shown in Figure 2, the  
extension system today is organized in a hierarchical format. 
The PACO is a member of the Provincial Development Coordination 
Committee (PDCC). Heads of DACO sit on the District Development 
Coordination Committees (DDCC). These development coordination 
committees are platforms where all heads of sector ministries and 
NGOs in Western Province, community representatives like councilors, 
and members of parliament meet to discuss the development 
initiatives underway and those planned for the province. Also,  
the development coordination committees aim to facilitate  
synergies among stakeholders and minimize duplication of  
development effort. These mechanisms can respond to community 
concerns for improved farming practices and crop diversification 
at both district and provincial levels. Currently, for instance, the 
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is financing the 
Rural Extension Service Capacity Advancement Project (RESCAP), 
which seeks to enhance the capacity of the agricultural extension 
service and develop the rice chain. 
Extension that fosters improved farming practices and crop  
diversification in the Barotse floodplain revolves around the  
programs of the PACO. The agricultural extension workers are a 
conduit for the transfer of technologies from the National  
Agricultural Research System (NARS) to farmers through 
approaches such as farmer field schools. Agricultural extension 
workers focus on technology transfer. However, this focus does not 
facilitate interaction between farmers and other knowledge bases. 
The agricultural extension workers could play the role of  
knowledge brokers and link the farmers with other forms of  
knowledge, such as food processing or enterprise developments, 
but the knowledge-brokering role is currently a gap in the  
extension system. Given the systemic and integrated approach that 
the AAS program proposes, innovation brokering among users and 
suppliers of knowledge along the value chains becomes critical.
FISP is an example of a government farming practice and crop 
diversification initiative. FISP is a subsidy program for farm inputs 
designed for vulnerable but viable farmers. However, reviews 
of FISP show that elites, instead of poor farmers, are the major 
beneficiaries of the program (Mulikelela, 2013). Experiences 
from FISP have a bearing on AAS program planning. Programs 
designed for the poor can be implemented by individuals who are 
seeking opportunities to improve their agricultural productivity. 
Successful farmers are also looking for opportunities in the same 
environment in which the poor are located. The elite farmers have 
tacit and technical knowledge that is key for innovation, and they 
have a capacity to capture initiatives designed for the poor. There 
is a need to develop programs that accommodate the aspirations 
of the poor farmers but provide opportunities for the successful 
farmers as well. Examples include value chain upgrading in areas 
such as processing and marketing. 
The decentralization of government roles is a positive drive towards 
prioritizing local concerns. However, while in theory development 
planning authority lies with the provincial administration, in practice
the national bureaucracy still retains some authority. This residual 
authority in the national bureaucracy creates gaps in the 
decentralization process. Each of the departmental sectors operates 
independently of the others; for example, fisheries departments 
in the Ministry of Agriculture are divorced from Zambia Wildlife 
Authority (ZAWA) parks in the Ministry of the Environment.  
The provincial heads report to the PS on general administration  
matters, but for technical issues they report to their directors in 
their line ministries. Likewise, the extension officers that operate 
at camp level work under the leadership of the district commissioners 
and work with community leaders. The ministry at national level 
determines professional advancement. In essence, the  
decentralization process has not facilitated the anticipated  
autonomy of provincial and local decision-making.  
Where resources are scarce, this tension between the center and 
the province may tilt the balance in favor of the former.  
Such tensions may emerge where politicians, such as members of 
parliament or councilors, may and often do want to politicize FISP 
as a means of extending political patronage.
The provincial and district coordination committees provide  
opportunities for social learning. The previous section pointed 
to the tension between allegiance to the provincial and local 
systems and central line ministries. Tension between local and  
national levels is not limited to the public sector. A respondent 
from one of the NGOs in Western Province recounted a case where 
through meetings at the PDCC, the non-state sector players 
began to identify unexploited synergies among themselves. 
However, the official revealed that the collaboration did not 
go far because some of the NGOs viewed the other NGOs as  
competitors for funding. In this view, collaboration would make 
it more difficult to claim attribution for certain positive outputs. 
In other words, for the NGOs, their primary challenge is to secure 
more funding for their activities and to be accountable to their 
donors; collaboration with other players becomes less urgent.
In some instances, the beneficiary communities are also not in 
favor of NGOs working together to assist them. At face value this 
is a positive stance arising from the reality that the communities 
have seen of the NGOs working better independently than  
collectively. However, an official from an NGO informed us that 
farmers’ associations sometimes prefer dealing with different 
NGOs separately because it enables them to play one NGO 
against the other and occasionally may create opportunities for 
double dipping. 
For the purposes of AAS program planning, this aspect of partner 
accountability dynamics expressed through niche preservation 
is important. The competition is not restricted to inter-NGO  
interaction but is also directed at the AAS program.  
The cross-sector and multi-level approach the AAS program takes 
can be viewed as dwarfing the other players that focus on single 
sectors and political boundaries rather than ecosystems. The 
AAS program uses a participatory action planning and learning 
approach designed to allow for stakeholder interaction. For 
example, Knowledge-Sharing and Learning Platforms (KSLP) 
are a proposed avenue for stakeholder mutual learning. A key 
challenge will be to encourage stakeholders like the NGOs to 
overcome suspicion, which blocks information sharing. The 
AAS program will need to devise a brokering mechanism 
that provides win-win incentives for the respective NGOs.
Concerns with niche and capacity to claim attribution also affect  
partner cooperation. If NGOs are primarily accountable to their 
donors, it may mean that they will view the AAS program in that 
context. Those partners that are able to independently develop 
programs and mobilize funds might find little incentive to  
cooperate with the program. On the other hand, some that  
cooperate with the program might be attracted by the  
opportunity to leverage resources rather than the principles of 
the AAS program. In such circumstances, a deliberate process is 
needed, where partners move from strategies designed mainly 
for organizational survival to those that seek to empower local 
communities.
Key points to be addressed
•	 The geography of the Barotse floodplain within the  
trans-boundary Zambezi River Basin requires a broader  
perspective on how upstream land use and water  
management affect local livelihoods downstream.
•	 Gender norms limiting women’s access to land pose a  
constraint on livelihood options.
•	 Improving service delivery requires making extension services 
and NGOs more accountable to local communities. Farmers’ 
associations and women’s groups have a key role to play.
•	 Building stronger coordination of development efforts  
requires addressing the relationship between the BRE, the 
PACO, and other government agencies.
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Issue 2. Livestock management and  
diversification
After Southern Province, Western Province is the second major 
beef cattle producer in the Zambian economy. Barotse cattle 
comprise 25% of the indigenous stock in the country. The value of 
cattle in the Barotse floodplain is more than economic. Cattle are 
a source of manure, meat, and milk; a hedge against emergencies; 
a source of savings; a form of currency in marriage and litigation; 
and a status symbol. Cattle are pastured on common pool  
rangelands. There is no restriction on the size of the herds  
households can pasture in these rangelands. Even in times of 
pasture scarcity, there is little incentive for an individual to reduce 
the herd size. Cattle are considered men’s property; women 
keep chickens, because they are easy to sell or to consume in the 
household. Small ruminants like goats are not popular because 
they are management intensive. 
Cattle production has been affected by the prevalence of  
diseases, especially foot-and-mouth disease and contagious  
bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP). Cattle are pastured on  
common pool rangelands during the wet season. In the dry 
season, the pastures include the stover on farms. As is the case 
for cattle, poor veterinary support negatively affects the chicken 
enterprise. Diseases like Newcastle disease and coccidiosis are 
common. Well-to-do farmers collaborate and purchase their 
own veterinary services. 
In principle, the BRE is responsible for rangeland governance. 
However, some of the respondents feel that the authority of the 
BRE over the pastures is waning. For instance, burning of pastures 
is no longer coordinated. Poachers burn the grass to trap animals, 
depleting the grazing areas. Some households burn the grass as a 
way of stopping wild and domestic animals from damaging  
their crops. Crop farmers resort to this method because the  
traditional method is to report any crop damage by livestock to 
the induna. However, there is a feeling among some respondents 
that indunas do not compensate the aggrieved consistently. In 
some cases, it appears that the social status of the litigants  
influences the manner in which the matter is handled.
Several players are involved in decision-making in the livestock 
sector. The Department of Livestock Development and the  
Department of Veterinary Services are part of the PACO,  
custodians of livestock policies of the state. The BRE also has  
its own induna responsible for livestock and pastures. The induna 
does not play a key role in the development of livestock policies 
save to manage conflicts arising from using the rangelands on the 
floodplain and the uplands. Golden Valley Agricultural Research 
Trust (GART), Heifer International, and Zambia Agricultural  
Research Institute (ZARI) carry out research and advocacy  
activities in the province. Livestock farmers’ associations promote 
the interests of livestock farmer producers. 
Decision-making authority regarding development programs has 
rested with public sector players and research organizations. The 
BRE is marginally involved in policy formulation, but has more of 
a role in facilitating the implementation of government policies. 
The BRE views it as abnormal that while it is the grassroots-based 
local authority, the state does not seek its involvement in policy  
formulation. For instance, J. Chanda writes in the Times of Zambia 
(2012) that the Livestock Development Program (LDP) sponsored 
by the Dutch Government was a well-intentioned program in 
Western Province. Chanda goes on to note, however, that the 
LDP waned when the donors left, because civil servants who 
were left in charge appropriated project investments for private 
use. Chanda asserts that exclusion of the BRE in the project was a 
driver for its collapse.
Key points to be addressed
•	 The BRE’s weak capacity to manage rangelands leads to  
tension between livestock farmers and crop farmers. Some 
farmers give up on crop farming because of the fear of crop 
damage by livestock. Strengthening management of this 
common pool resource is a priority for improving local  
productivity.
•	 Veterinary services are particularly weak in responding to the 
priorities of poorer livestock holders, such as women raising 
chickens. Opportunities to improve service delivery require 
stronger involvement of farmer organizations and women’s 
groups, and coordination with existing livestock development 
projects in the hub.
•	 Private sector interest in Western Province presents an  
opportunity for improving both cattle and poultry enterprises. 
Strengthening the downward accountability of government 
departments is key to ensuring that this investment delivers 
opportunities and benefits to poorer households.
The objectivity of Chanda’s claims is debatable, but his comments 
echo sentiments commonly expressed by stakeholders (see sidebar). 
For instance, NGO actors emphasize the critical role of the BRE in 
project success. Civil service staff also emphasize the importance 
of involving the BRE in any initiative that involves community  
participation. Chanda’s claims are important in underlining the 
value accorded to the BRE by the community. 
Farmers’ associations also complain of exclusion from the  
decision-making process even on matters that affect them.  
Community engagement reports document that some communities
in the plain shunned projects promoting pig rearing because 
the projects did not respond to local priorities, and people had 
legitimate concerns about pig’s defecating in and contaminating 
water sources. This feeling of exclusion in decision-making was 
also expressed by one of the farmers’ association representatives 
who attended the Stakeholder Consultation Workshop: “We are 
ignored,” she said, “because they say we are uneducated villagers.”
“While land-use methods such as agriculture have not changed 
greatly in nature over the long time that the area has been  
settled, they are intensifying due to population pressures.  
In addition, people living in the Barotse floodplain area have  
reported considerable declines in useful plants, fish, and  
wildlife since the 1960s.”
Source: Turpie et al. (1999)
“Hunting and poaching have increased since control over  
hunting has passed from the Barotse Royal Establishment 
and its local representatives to central government after  
independence. The transfer of control and the tendency of  
central governments to grant hunting licenses and other 
resource use concessions to outsiders, including foreigners, has 
led to a lack of interest and involvement in conservation and  
resource management among local people. This negative 
change is despite a cultural heritage that placed great  
importance on sustainable resource use.”
Source: Simwinji (1997)
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decisions not solely based on 
the induna’s preferences. 
Although it is too early to  
assess the AWF initiative, the 
arrangement where a  
traditional leader shares 
power with his or her  
community and extension 
workers is an innovative way 
to address the parallel  
authority system. This  
example shows that the 
authority of the BRE can be 
negotiated positively with the 
aid of actors in brokering roles.
“Fishers sell to traders at very 
cheap prices, and it is these  
traders who gain the most. 
While this linkage assures 
the fishers of a ready market, 
it begs the question: How 
profitable is it to the producer? 
Could there be opportunities 
for fishers and the local people 
to maximize benefits from fish 
trading?”
Source: Adapted from the Barotse 
Hub Partner Analysis Report (2012)
Issue 3. Sustainable management of fisheries
In this section, we present two initiatives illustrating divergent  
approaches to governance of fisheries and aquaculture. One 
example, from the upper Zambezi fishery, shows that traditional 
leadership is not a neutral role and can work against policy designs 
on devolution. The second example, from an integrated aquaculture 
project, shows a practical way of getting around this challenge.
The upper Zambezi fishery is under the dual authority of the 
Department of Fisheries (DOF) and the BRE. The DOF has its  
provincial office in Mongu, manned by a Provincial Fisheries  
Development Officer, who is supported by district fisheries  
officers at Kalabo, Lukulu, Mongu, Senanga, and Mwandi. 
Africa Parks, ZAWA, and the BRE have formed a partnership to  
rehabilitate and manage wildlife and fisheries in the Liuwa Plain 
National Park. Dutch donors are funding the partnership. 
A unique feature of the Liuwa plain system is that unlike the rest 
of the Barotse floodplain system, it is located in a protected area as 
part of the Liuwa Plain National Park. However, about 20,000 people 
reside in the park and earn a livelihood from the Liuwa floodplain 
fisheries and other aquatic agricultural system activities under  
co-management arrangements with ZAWA and Africa Parks Zambia. 
The DOF is responsible for 
issuing fishing licenses and 
carrying out research, and 
the BRE is responsible for 
stewardship of the  
ecosystem in general as a 
common property regime. 
De facto, however, it is 
predominantly a free-access 
system where migrant fishers 
get permission from local 
headmen and indunas to  
settle in seasonal camps, 
which are widely scattered along the banks of the  
Zambezi. In the Liuwa Park, the indunas receive a dividend from 
the Africa Parks Authorities as part of the benefit-sharing scheme. 
Group discussions revealed that community members feel that 
the indunas are not transparent in the manner in which they use 
the dividend. In the case of fishing licenses, the DOF typically 
issues these to outsiders, not locals, and the revenue generated 
from these licenses is usually not shared equally with traditional 
authorities. A related concern is that fish traders from outside 
the area appear to be taking a large part of the profit in the value 
chain, further limiting income for local fishers (see sidebar).
Each year from December to February, the DOF declares a closed 
season that outlaws fishing on inland water bodies. Even though 
this closure period is fixed, the DOF must consult the BRE before 
the ban commences. Closed seasons implemented without  
consulting the BRE lead to weak compliance. Communities fishing 
from the floodplain sometimes flout the fishing ban. Although 
there are regulations on net mesh size, prohibited mesh size nets 
are commonly used. In other years, the fishery is effectively open 
access, with users taking advantage of the impasse between the BRE 
and the DOF. In some years however, depending on the level of 
consultations, the BRE assists the DOF to enforce the closed season.
The African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) is promoting a different 
approach through its integrated fish-farming project in Mwandi, 
Western Province. Of relevance to this analysis is the institutional 
innovation the project introduced. In the Liuwa system, the Litunga 
and the indunas are the key players in decision-making and  
benefit appropriation. In the AWF’s Nyambe community  
development project located in Mwandi, on the other hand, a 
trust makes the decisions. The trust comprises community  
members, extension workers, and the induna. The trust makes the 
“When we reached the village 
for visioning and action  
planning, the men confronted 
us, saying, ‘You can talk about  
anything else, but not fishing; 
we do not have any other 
means of survival.’”
Source: Personal communication 
with the Community Engagement 
team (June, 2013)
Synthesis and conclusion 
We started this analysis by pointing out that gaps in policy  
frameworks and institutions can bias natural resource governance 
outcomes against marginal groups. We also highlighted the  
paradox of the Barotse floodplain being an ecosystem of high 
potential yet with widespread poverty. In this section, we now 
look at the major governance obstacles that contribute to this 
anomaly. We also point out governance opportunities that, if  
addressed, can lead to positive AAS program outcomes.
Enabling effective representation
Currently, agricultural research practice in Zambia is largely based 
on a pipeline approach that separates producers from consumers 
of knowledge. Recent reviews of international experience indicate 
that such approaches often fail to justify investments in research 
that prioritizes development outcomes (Hall et al., 2013; Mbabu 
and Hall, 2012). In order to respond to the livelihoods aspirations 
of the poor, the AAS program has to invest in efforts to reconfigure 
the relationships between researchers and farmers, consistent 
with the research-in-development paradigm (AAS, 2012a). While 
keeping this focus on local livelihoods, it is important to recognize 
that the Barotse floodplain is embedded within broader regional 
ecosystems and governance structures. Regional and national 
water and wetland management bodies, as well as catchment 
boards, are key governance actors. The AAS program needs to be 
linked to these bodies for compliance and coordination.  
Organizing effectively to pursue the hub development challenge 
requires processes that enable diverse stakeholders to build 
mutual understanding of the obstacles and opportunities in their 
governance context, to explore options for influencing change, 
and to take actions that help achieve collective priorities.
Key points to be addressed
•	 Fishing is critical to alleviate household food deficits, but 
income opportunities for local fishers are limited. Poor road 
networks, underdeveloped markets, and weak governance 
in the fish value chain benefit “middlemen” traders at the 
expense of fishing households.
•	 Addressing local livelihoods through fisheries and  
aquaculture requires a broader perspective on regional water 
management, as well as fish value chains reaching urban 
markets. The remote location of Barotse fisheries means 
central regulation has limited impact; involvement of the BRE 
and communities is key.
•	 Collaboration is critical between initiatives focused on  
livelihood improvement and those focused on wildlife 
conservation, including those supported by AWF, WWF, and 
Africa Parks. Innovations like those promoted by AWF, which 
update the relationship between the traditional authority and 
the community and service providers, merit close attention to 
harvest lessons.
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Navigating multiple authorities
As has been described, authority structures in the Barotse  
floodplain system include traditional as well as bureaucratic  
systems. The parallel institutions of the BRE and national and  
provincial government bodies will continue to be part of the  
governance system into the future. In some instances, these  
centers of authority are at cross purposes, and in other  
circumstances they collaborate. In theory, both traditional and 
bureaucratic systems acknowledge the legitimacy of the other,  
although there is variation in practice. There are opportunities for 
a working relationship that includes both sides. In order to  
succeed, the AAS program has to play a brokering role and build the  
capacity of local actors to mediate and improve inter- 
organizational relations over time.
Strengthening downward accountability
The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL) and the NGOs 
coordinate improved farm productivity and diversification  
activities in the Barotse hub. Although NGOs follow independent 
programs, the MAL plays an advisory role. Furthermore, these  
actors meet in the PDCC. Government departments are  
accountable to their head offices and not to the provincial  
leadership. Budget planning is decentralized, but the final  
allocation is from central governments. This distribution of power 
suggests strong upward accountability and weak downward  
accountability. In practice, however, local politicians are key  
players in their capacity to influence public opinion and their  
access to higher offices, which allows them to control local  
officers’ conduct by virtue of their ruling political party  
connections (Chileshe, n.d.).
In seeking to improve coordination among these various actors, 
the AAS program needs to concurrently help strengthen  
downward accountability, so that the actions of government 
agencies and NGOs alike respond more effectively to the needs 
and priorities of poor households and communities in the 
floodplain.
Conclusion
Governance arrangements have developed in the Barotse  
ecosystem over time. These arrangements are valuable for their 
linkages with the grassroots and national-level institutions. At 
the same time, for a program designed for social and ecological 
transformation, concomitant institutional change is necessary. 
The issues explored in this report demonstrate that much of the 
scope for transformation lies in shifts in the relationships among 
communities, traditional authorities, the state, and private sector 
actors. This transformation is critical to create the space for  
communities to give voice to their interests and see these  
reflected in new opportunities for livelihood improvement.
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Appendix 1: Summary of Key Issues, Constraints, and Opportunities From the Community  
Visioning Exercises
Key issues identified Score Constraints (not ranked) Opportunities (not ranked)
Improved farming 
practices and crop 
diversification
10 1. Poor soil fertility 
2. Gap in knowledge of and adoption of new 
technologies and difficulty in accessing  
improved seeds (early maturity seeds) 
3. Low irrigation system adoption 
4. Inadequate extension services; underutilization 
of the floodplain land to increase production 
5. Governance: require improved support from 
government and better delivery of inputs
1. BRE on community mobilization and policy 
formulation; village-level committees and  
existing community structures; people of  
influence (e.g., politicians, religious leaders, 
traditional leaders) for lobbying and advocacy
2. Contact farmers/lead farmers/resource  
farmers for knowledge sharing through farmer 
field school concept, exchange visits, study 
circle concept
3. Area farmers’ associations       District Farmers’ 
Association       Zambia National Farmers’ Union, 
for advocacy, bargaining, and information
4. DACO, for agricultural coordination and policy 
direction; camp extension officers; Camp  
Agricultural Committee
5. Research institutions (e.g., ZARI, Conservation 
Farming Unit, GART) available in the area
Livestock  
management and  
diversification  
(includes small  
livestock)
6 1. Poor access to veterinary services and  
disease control; extension services’ limited 
knowledge on improved animal husbandry 
(e.g., livestock rearing and disease management, 
feeding and housing)
2. Non-availability and non-utilization of  
technology for improvement of local breeds
3. Uncontrolled bushfires—depleting or  
destroying pasture fields and reducing feeds; 
limited grazing fields during the floods; lack 
of feed/pasture storage for use during  
flooding
4. Poor market for the animals
5. Cattle rearing seen as a “cultural value” as  
opposed to business
1. BRE 
2. Contact farmers/lead farmers/resource farmers 
(e.g., farmer field schools); area farmers’  
associations       village-level committees and 
existing community structures; people of 
influence (e.g., politicians, religious leaders, 
traditional leaders)
3. DACO (on crop livestock integration); Camp  
Extension Officers; Livestock Department  
(District Level)       livestock production &  
disease management technical support; District 
Marketing & Agribusiness Department under 
MACO
4. Private sector organizations; e.g., Zambeef, 
livestock traders (agribusiness), financial  
institutions (loan providers)
5. Research institutions (e.g., ZARI, Livestock  
Research Unit); other organizations working in 
the communities (opportunistic linkage)
Sustainable  
management of 
fisheries
5 1. BRE bylaws—ineffectiveness in  
implementation; illegal and unsuitable  
fishing nets
2. Lack of protection of fish habitats (rivers, 
lagoons, and small streams)
3. Limited community ownership and  
participation in the management of fish 
resources
4. Fishing as “sole livelihood”—much pressure 
on the fish resource (natural) by the  
population (for income)
5. BRE, including local indunas & village headmen
6. Contact farmers/lead farmers/resource farmers 
(e.g., farmer field schools); fishers’ associations; 
commodity groups (fish); village-level  
committees and existing community structures; 
people of influence (e.g., politicians, religious 
leaders, traditional leaders)
7. Department of Fisheries; Camp Extension 
Officers; research institutions (e.g., Fisheries 
Research Unit); rural health clinics (on  
sensitization on appropriate use of nets)
8. Conservation institutions such as Africa Parks 
and Zambezi Wetland Mgt.; other organizations 
working in the communities (opportunistic 
linkage)
9. Sports fishing tourism operators (doing  
conservation)
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